Abstract-Widespread deployment of multicast depends critically on the existance of congestion control protocols that are provably fair to unicast traffic. In this work, we present an optimization-based congestion control mechanism for one-to-many communication with provable fairness properties. The optimization-based approach attempts to find an allocation of rates that maximizes the aggregate utility of the network. We show that the utility of multicast sessions must be defined in a particular way if a widely accepted property of aggregate utility is to hold. Our definition of session utility amounts to maximizing a weighted sum of simple utility functions, with weights determined by the number of receivers. The fairness properties of the optimal rate allocation depend both on the weights and form of utility function used. We show that although it is not strictly fair to unicast, the unfairness of our mechanism is bounded and can be controlled.
I. INTRODUCTION
Widespread deployment of multicast communication in the Internet depends critically on the existence of practical congestion control mechanisms that allow multicast and unicast traffic to share network resources fairly. Most service providers recognize multicast as an essential service to support a range of emerging network applications including audio and video broadcasting, bulk data delivery, and teleconferencing. Nevertheless, these network operators have been reluctant to enable multicast delivery in their networks, often citing concerns about the congestion such traffic may introduce. There is a clear need for multicast congestion control algorithms that are provably fair to unicast traffic if these concerns are to be addressed. In this paper, we present a congestion control mechanism for single-rate multicast traffic based on an economic pricing model and show that although it is not strictly fair to unicast traffic, its unfairness is bounded and can be controlled.
We first formulate the multicast congestion control problem as a utility maximization problem, extending existing work for unicast. A naive generalization of the existing formulation would treat single-rate multicast sessions no differently from unicast sessions, modeling each by an unweighted utility function and maximizing the sum of session utilities. One problem with the naive approach is that it penalizes individual multicast sessions for using more network resources than unicast sessions without rewarding them for the bandwidth saved on links shared by multiple receivers. More serious than its unfairness to multicast sessions, an approach that maximizes the unweighted sum of utilities turns out to violate a generally accepted property of aggregate utility, namely, that the preference of the aggregate does not change if we simply measure utility on a different scale. This common-sense notion is why, for example, we reject as nonsense the statement that, as a group, residents of New York prefer a temperature of 70 degrees to 60 degrees Fahrenheit, but prefer a temperature of 15.5 to 21 degrees Celsius. If this invariance property is violated in the congestion control problem, the network operating point deemed most desirable would depend on an arbitrary choice of utility scale. We define an approach that uses session weights based on the number of receivers that satisfies this property. Moreover, we show that this approach is necessary to preserve invariance under a change in utility scale.
A consequence of adding session weights based on the number of receivers is that the the resulting rate allocations tend to favor sessions with more receivers over those with fewer. Since the weighted sum does not remove the original penalty against sessions that use more resources, it is not immediately clear whether multicast sessions fare better or worse than unicast under our modified formulation. We show that while our formulation favors multicast sessions, the resulting unfairness can be controlled and remains bounded in the network topologies we have considered.
Our work is based on a promising economics-inspired approach called optimization-based congestion control [1] , which casts the congestion problem as one of utility maximization (alternately, cost minimization). This approach provides an elegant theoretical framework in which congestion signals are interpreted as prices, network users are modeled as utility maximizers, and the network sets prices in such a way to drive this set of self-interested users to a desirable operating point where their aggregate utility is maximized. This approach is appealing because it provides a sound formal foundation with which to develop congestion control mechanisms and understand their impact on the global behavior of the network. Specific link service disciplines and rate-control algorithms at end-hosts can be thought of as components of a distributed computation to solve the global optimization problem. Thus, improvements in congestion control can proceed in a principled fashion, driven by improvements in the underlying optimization algorithm. While the optimization-based approach has received much attention [2] , [3] , [4] , [5] , [6] , [7] , [8] , [9] , [10] , it has not yet, to our knowledge, been applied to multicast congestion control. We will see in this paper, that applying this model to multicast offers a formal foundation for developing fair multicast congestion control algorithms.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: In Section II, we introduce the optimization-based approach and review related work. We extend the problem formulation to single-rate multicast in Section III. In Section IV we consider multicast session utility functions in detail, presenting a axiomatic argument in favor of a particular definition. The fairness properties of our definition are analyzed in Sections V-VII where we show that multicast sessions are favored and present evidence that such unfairness can be controlled. We conclude by briefly discussing the development of practical control mechanisms based on our results and highlighting future work.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Optimization-based congestion control casts the problem of bandwidth sharing as one of utility maximization. In a basic formulation, the network is modeled as a set of unidirectional links Ä ½ Ä . Associated with each link is a capacity, Ð for link Ð. Let
The workload for the network is generated by a set of sessions 1 Ë, which consume bandwidth. The set of links used by a particular session, ×, is Ä´×µ Ä. For a unicast session, the links of Ä´×µ are arranged end-to-end, forming an acyclic path between a source and a receiver. However, the topology of sessions is not explicit in the formulation.
The set Ä´×µ can be any subset of links-for example, a tree in the case of multicast. The set of sessions using any particular link, Ð, is Ë´Ðµ Ë. which is assumed to be an increasing and strictly concave function of session rate Ü × . The network's objective is to optimize social welfare:
The desirable network operating point is defined by the vector of session rates that solves this problem. The problem (1-2) can be solved using convex optimization techniques [11] . Under a standard economic interpretation, the Lagrange multipliers of such techniques are referred to as shadow prices and can be shown to function as prices of network links [12] . The essential step in developing practical rate-control algorithms is to find a distributed algorithm for solving (1) (2) in which each individual session need only compute a local optimization to set its own rates. There is a growing body of research devoted to finding such a distributed algorithm and using it as a basis for unicast rate-control in practical protocols [2] , [3] , [4] , [5] , [6] , [7] , [9] , [8] , [10] .
Kelly [2] decomposes the basic optimization problem (1-2) into session and link subproblems, enabling the distributed computation of optimal rates. In addition to demonstrating the possibility of such a decomposition, Kelly also shows that the fairness properties satisfied by the resulting rate allocation are dependent on the functional form of session utility. In particular, proportional fairness is shown to result from the use of a logarithmic utility function, Í ×´Ü µ ÐÓ ´Üµ.
A vector of session rates Ü £ is said to be proportionally fair if it is feasible and for any other feasible vector Ü ×¾Ë Ü × Ü £ × Ü £ × ¼ Proportional fairness favors smaller flows less strictly than the more commonly used fairness criterion of max-min fairness [13] . A vector of rates Ü £ is max-min fair if it is feasible and no individual's rate Ü × can be feasibly increased without decreasing the rate of a less well-off in-
Kelly formally identifies proportional fairness and max-min fairness as two points on a continuum. An interesting finding in our work, presented in our technical report, is the location of tcp-fairness within this continuum [14] . Low and Lapsley [6] have proposed a distributed algorithm based on a solution to the dual of problem (1) (2) ; this work provides the basis for our work presented here. The basic idea of their algorithm is that each link in the network continuously adjusts its price and each session computes its optimal rate as a simple function of the total price of the links it uses. In order to offset a bias that favors short unicast paths over long ones, Low and Laplsey consider a modified optimization objective function that maximizes a weighted sum of session utilities. We too will use session weights to deal with a similar source of unfairness and show how these weights can be meaningfully assigned to multicast session utility functions.
Kunniyur and Srikant [5] use a penalty function formulation to separate problem (1-2) into a set of session optimization problems that can be solved by individual senderreceiver pairs using only end-to-end packet loss information, or with ECN-style marks on packets if available. In addition to the logarithmic utility function, these authors investigate the minimum potential delay (MPD) utility function [15] , Í´Üµ ½ Ü. In the penalty function formulation, an additive-increase/multiplicative-decrease control algorithm (the class of algorithm to which TCP congestion control belongs) emerges as a natural way for individual sessions to maintain a local optimality condition under the MPD utility function. 2 
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We modify the problem formulation of (1) slightly by defining a session utility function as a function of a vector of rates Ü × ´Ü ×Ð Ð ¾ Ä´×µµ. In single-rate multicast, the rate Ü ×Ð is the same on all links, but this formulation allows us to define a variety of session utility functions. Following the approach of Low and Lapsley [6] , we find the solution to optimization problem (1) by solving its dual. The Lagrangian of (1) ily of tcp-friendly control algorithms all of which are consistent with the optimality condition derived in [5] . Interested readers can find more details in the our technical report [14] .
where
Exploiting the separability of the first term in the Lagrangian, we can allow each user to perform an independent maximization of its own benefit ×´ × µ, where × is the sum of all the link prices seen by user × 3 . The dual problem is a minimization of the dual objective function with respect to the link prices.
Conceptually, the network computes the link prices £ that solve (5) . By duality theory, the rate vector that results from each user's maximization,´Ü ×´ £ µ × ¾ Ëµ, contains the optimal rates in the original problem (1). The link prices summarize all of the congestion information relevant to each user, allowing them to perform a local maximization without coordinating with other users. Solving the original optimization problem in this way requires that users have some way to learn about the prices of the network resources they use. In the multicast case, × is interpreted as the sum of link prices for the entire tree. The essential difference between the session maximization problem (4) and that considered by Low and Lapsley is the definition of the session utility function. In (4), the session utility function maps a vector of rates to a scalar utility value. More than one mapping can be defined and we will consider several alternatives later in this paper. At present, we consider one possible mapping that yields a basic control algorithm similar to Low and Lapsley's.
Consider the following session utility function, for which the session utility is defined as the sum of receivers' utilities in the multicast tree:
where Ê´×µ is the set of links in Ä´×µ that terminate at receivers and Ù Ê · Ê is a utility function from a scalar to a scalar. We assume that all receivers have identical utility functions, Í ×Ð´Ü× µ Ù´Ü × µ × ¾ Ë. If Ê × Ê´×µ , ¿ In the unicast case, × would be the price of the path between source and receiver.
the first-derivative condition for (4) is
Ignoring, for the moment, the problems of determining × in a multicast tree, we rewrite the update rules of Low and Lapsley's basic algorithm for unicast [6] :
The only difference between these update rules and Low and Lapsley's unicast algorithm is that the multicast session price is divided by the number of receivers in the rate update rule 10. 4 The effect of this price reduction is that the session can send at a higher rate than the unicast algorithm would allow. Since the price reduction depends on the number of receivers in the session, so does the increase in session rate. It is not clear whether an update rule like (10) leads to a rate allocation that one would consider fair, since it appears that sessions with more receivers get faster rates. Since the update rules (9-10) were derived using a particular definition of session utility function, perhaps an alternate definition would lead to a more fair allocation. In the following sections we consider these issues and analyze the affect of this definition on the fairness properties of the resulting congestion control mechanism. We will see that a class of session utility functions that includes (6-7), while not absolutely fair to unicast sessions, does not starve them in the presence of larger sessions. Moreover, utility functions in this class satisfy an important invariance property that other functions do not.
IV. MULTICAST UTILITY FUNCTIONS
In Section III, we generalized the unicast optimization problem formulation to accommodate single rate multicast sessions. We were able to re-derive Low and Lapsley's update rules with only minor modifications. However, there is a subtle problem with this model that makes it difficult to apply to single-rate multicast. The problem concerns the definition of utility for an individual multicast session. A single scalar utility value is used to characterize the benefit of a higher rate to the session. For a unicast session, it makes little difference whether we consider this benefit to belong to the sender or receiver. For the purpose of unicast Low and Lapsley's convergence results remain valid for algorithm ( 9-10).
congestion control, we can treat the sender's and receiver's objectives as being one and the same. A multicast session, in contrast, has multiple receivers whose individual objectives are generally not the same. A receiver connected by a high-bandwidth path from the source might benefit from a high session rate that would result in loss to other receivers with more constrained bandwidth.
One approach towards defining multicast session utility ignores this heterogeneity among receivers and defines its session utility function only with respect to the sender. 5 An alternative approach would be to define session utility as a function of the utilities of the receivers in the session. We informally refer to these two approaches as sender-oriented and receiver-oriented, respectively. It is not immediately clear which approach is most appropriate for multicast congestion control. Later in this section we will formalize these definitions and argue in favor of a receiver-oriented approach. Before doing so, however, we will digress briefly to provide some background about the use of utility functions in economics and the theory of social choice.
A. Digression: Utility Functions and Social Welfare
The use of concave increasing utility functions to represent session utility has a natural and intuitive interpretation. Utility is is a monotonically increasing function of its input when individuals prefer having as much of the input as possible. The concavity of the utility function captures the idea of diminishing marginal utility 6 . Both concavity and monotonicity are appropriate assumptions in the case of bandwidth for elastic traffic [17] , where the input to the utility function is the session rate. 7 Utility can be difficult to quantify precisely; there is no clear unit of utility and no agreed upon scale. Comparing the utility of two individuals can be tricky, particularly when they do not share the same utility function. Because of the difficulty in performing interpersonal comparisons of utility, economists customarily think of utility as an ordinal magnitude, meaning that the absolute magnitude of utility is meaningless, but that the relative magnitudes of utilities at various rates for an individual session define preferences among rates and the relative differences in magnitude indicate the strength of the preferences [18] . A consequence of considering only ordinal magnitudes is
We are assuming that multicast sessions have a single source. The term 'marginal utility' is used in economics to refer to the first derivative of the utility function.
In this section, utility will be assumed to be a function of session rate; we do so for the sake of concreteness and continuity with the rest of the paper. It should be understood, however, that the discussion presented here applies to any utility function.
that utility functions are unique only up to a linear transformation. That is, the utility maximizing behavior of an individual with utility function Ù´Üµ is indistinguishable from one whose utility function is a linear transformation of Ù´Üµ. This restriction makes intuitive sense because a linear transformation simply represents a change in scale and a translation of the zero point of the utility function.
The notion of an aggregate utility function is a compelling extension of the concept of individual utility. Aggregate utility is defined by a social welfare function (SWF) that maps the vector of all session utilities to a scalar utility value representing the social desirability of the corresponding vector of rates. Since the SWF is not one-to-one, it induces a partial ordering over allocations of rates, known as the social preference relation (SPR). As with individual utility functions, we are primarily interested in this preference relation rather than the absolute magnitude of the SWF.
There are many ways to define the SWF, each carrying with it some subjective judgment about how individual preferences should be combined to determine a social preference. It is possible, however, to list some properties that seem reasonable for any definition of SWF [19] .
Complete: The SWF should be defined for all vectors of inputs.
Transitive: The induced SPR should be a transitive relation.
Pareto Efficient: Given a SWF Í´Üµ and two feasible vectors Ü and Ü ¼ which differ only in one element such that Ù ´Ü µ Ù ´Ü ¼ µ, it must be the case that Í´Üµ Í´Ü ¼ µ. In other words, if it is possible to increase one individual's utility without reducing any other's, doing so should improve the aggregate utility. This property is somewhat subtle; notice that it is possible for two individuals to disagree in their preferences under Ù. However, if each individual's preference is unaffected by a change from Ù to Ú, then any such disagreements will persist. The IIA property demands that the social preference also be unaffected under these circumstances. In other words, the socially preferred allocation is invariant under a change in individual utility functions that leaves individuals' preferences unaffected.
Independent of Irrelevant

Non-dictatorial:
A SWF Í is said to be non-dictatorial if there exists no individual with utility function Ù such that Ù ´Ü µ Ù ´Ý µ´µ Í´Üµ Í´Ýµ Ü Ý Perhaps the most important result of social choice theory is Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, which states that no SWF can simultaneously satisfy all of the properties listed above [20] . In optimization-based congestion control, we adopt the sum of individual utilities as the SWF. It is easy to demonstrate that this SWF violates the IIA property. Indeed, it is precisely this violation of IIA that allows us to associate optimal rates under different functional forms of utility with different formal definitions of fairness.
Although the IIA property is neither required nor (in light of the Impossibility Theorem) worth pursuing for the congestion control application, a related but weaker property is still worthy of consideration.
Invariance for any values of « ¬. In words, the SWF induces the same preference relation for Ù and Ú.
The ILT property builds on the assertion that individual utility functions are unique up to a linear transformation, saying that aggregate preferences, too, are invariant under such a transformation. We will see shortly under some definitions of multicast session utility the ILT property is satisfied, while under others it is not.
B. Sender-and Receiver-Oriented Utility Functions
We now formally define sender-and receiver-oriented concepts of session utility. Consider a single-rate multicast session × with rate Ü and receiver set Ê with size Ê. In the sender-oriented approach, session utility function is a single concave increasing function of the session rate Ù ×´Ü µ.
Í ×Ò Ù ×´Ü µ (11) In the receiver-oriented approach, each receiver ¾ Ê has a utility function Ù ´Üµ, which is concave and increasing.
The session utility function is the sum of receiver utilities.
Í ÖÚ ¾Ê Ù ´Üµ (12) We can convert these definitions into an alternate form by making two assumptions. First, we assume that all receivers have identical utility functions.
Ù ´Üµ Ù Ö´× µ ¾ Ê Second, in the limit of a single receiver, both senderand receiver-oriented utility functions should reduce to the same standard unicast utility function up to a linear transformation.
Ù ×´Ü µ Ù Ö´× µ
These assumptions allow us to express both types of session utility functions as the product of a base utility function Ù´¡µ and a scaling function ´¡µ. The base utility function, Ù´¡µ depends only on the session rate and is concave and increasing. It can be thought of as the utility function of a session with a single receiver. The scaling function ´¡µ depends on the number of receivers in the session. It must be monotonic in its argument, although it need not be strictly increasing.
For a sender-oriented definition of session utility, ´Êµ , where is a constant.
Í ×Ò ´Ü Êµ Ù´Üµ Í ÖÚ´Ü Êµ Ê Ù´Üµ (14) It is possible entertain definitions of session utility different from those we present here. We choose these because they are commonplace and mathematically tractable. One obtains equation (13) by treating all sessions equivalently, regardless of the number of receivers. Equation (14) reflects the idea that multicast session utility is itself a social welfare function, representing the aggregate utility of the receiver set. Under our assumptions, this equation is equivalent to the sum of receiver utilities-a simple and commonly used social welfare function
C. The Session-Splitting Problem
In Section IV-B, we identified two alternative definitions of multicast session utility based on sender-or receiver orientation. Now we consider these two definitions in more detail and determine which makes sense in the context of congestion control. We begin by attempting to capture the effect of flexible group membership using an optimizationbased approach. Golestani and Sabnani [21] observe that if receivers in a session can be dropped and reassigned to a different session in response to congestion, it is often desirable to split a multicast group into subgroups with different rates. One can think of this form of congestion control as an approximation of multi-rate multicast that does not violate the constraint of having a single rate per session.
The presence of additional sessions in the network after splitting may increase contention on existing bottlenecks or even create new bottlenecks Thus not all ways of splitting a session lead to an overall improvement in received rates. Ideally, one would like to find a way to split the session that offers higher rate to some receivers without reducing the rates of any others. A less ideal, but perhaps still tolerable split might reduce some receivers' rates but improve the utilization of the network and allow many more receivers to receive at a higher rate. In economic terms, we would like to find a way of splitting a session that maximizes utility. In this section, we consider the use of sender-and receiver-oriented social welfare functions to determine whether splitting a session will improve aggregate utility. We will show that the only way to obtain a "reasonable" solution to this optimization problem is by using a receiver oriented definition of utility.
We seek a definition of aggregate utility that captures our intuitions about when splitting the multicast session is a good idea and when it is not. More precisely, we want to know if it is reasonable to use sender-or receiver-oriented social welfare function to determine whether splitting a session will improve aggregate utility. The choice of sender-or receiver-oriented utility as well as the form of the base utility function may affect aggregate utility. However, for a fixed choice of these factors, we expect the SWF to be well-defined for all possible ways of splitting the session. Finally, the desirability of splitting should be insensitive to a linear transformation of the base utility function. If this were not the case, an arbitrary rescaling of utility could determine whether splitting a session is preferred over not splitting. We will observe that the desirability of splitting maintains this invariance in the case of a receiveroriented SWF but not in the case of a sender-oriented one.
We begin by formalizing the session splitting problem in terms of utility maximization. In the session-splitting problem, we have a network´AE Äµ with link capacities ´ Ð Ð ¾ Äµ. A set of receivers Ê AE could be served by one or more multicast sessions with source × ¾ AE Ê. We assume that the number and rates of all other sessions in the network are fixed. Capacities in thus represent the available capacity for multicast sessions serving receiver set Ê. Each session's rate is limited by its most constrained receiver, that is, by the receiver with the lowest link capacity along the path between it and the source. If this bottleneck link is not shared by all of the receivers, then it may be possible to split the session into two or more sessions yielding a higher rate to some receivers.
Splitting the session is equivalent to partitioning the receiver set into disjoint subsets È È ½ È ¾ È AE .
We will use È to denote the set of all possible partitions of Ê. Each partition in È represents one possible way to divide the receiver set into sessions. Each element of a partition represents a subset of Ê to be served by a different session. Rates may vary among sessions, but all receivers within a session must receive at a single rate. Computing the rates for each session is, itself, a non-trivial problem since some links will be shared by more than one session. There are many possible mechanisms for determining session rates. One example is the greedy algorithm suggested by Rubenstein, Kurose and Towsley [22] to achieve maxmin fairness among the sessions. For our purposes, it is sufficient to assume that we have some deterministic mechanism to perform this rate assignment, which we model as a rate allocation function
Given a partition È and an index , the rate allocation function returns the rate of the session serving È .
The session-splitting problem requires us to find a partition that maximizes the aggregate utility of the network. Recall that the optimization-based approach defines aggregate utility as the (possibly weighted) sum of all session utilities. Given a network´AE Äµ, capacities , receiver set Ê AE, sender ×, rate allocation function ´¡ ¡µ, base utility function Ù´¡µ, and scaling function ´¡µ, the optimal splitting is a partition that solves is the aggregate utility function. We can choose the scaling function from equations (13) and (14) to solve this problem for sender-and receiver-oriented definitions of session utility.
The aggregate utility function defines a partial ordering over È. In economic terms, this ordering is the social preference relation over all possible partitions of the receiver set. As explained in Section IV-A, it is customary to regard utility functions as unique up to a linear transformation. A reasonable restriction, therefore, is only to allow social preference relations that remain invariant under a linear transformation of the base utility function, as captured by the following axiom, similar to the ILT property in Section IV-A: [14] . One immediate consequence of this theorem is that if one accepts that Axiom 1 is indeed an appropriate requirement for any "reasonable" definition of aggregate utility, then our senderoriented utility definition is not "reasonable". More generally, we must either conclude that our receiver-oriented definition of utility is the only "reasonable" definition of session utility or reject Axiom 1 as a requirement for reasonability.
V. CONSEQUENCES OF RECEIVER-ORIENTED UTILITY FUNCTIONS
In section IV-C we argued that receiver oriented session utility functions are an appropriate model for multicast session utility in the session splitting problem. In this section, we return to the original congestion control problem and determine whether using receiver-oriented utility functions leads to fair sharing of bandwidth between unicast and multicast sessions. We rewrite the network optimization problem (1-2) is
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for optimality are
where the Ð are Lagrange multipliers or link prices and Ü Ð È ×¾Ë´Ðµ Ü × is the aggregate rate seen at link Ð. As before, we also write × È Ð¾Ä´×µ Ð as the total session price seen by session ×.
From the first Kuhn-Tucker condition (17), we observe that the use of receiver-oriented utility functions creates a bias in favor of sessions with large numbers of receivers. To see this, note that
The optimal rate for session ×, Ü £ × is given by
Equation (19) states that, at optimality, the a session's marginal utility should be proportional to its price divided by the number of receivers. We refer to this ratio × Ê × as the effective session price. The optimal rate can therefore be obtained by taking the inverse of the marginal utility function as shown in equation (20) . Since Í × is concave, Ù ¼ is a strictly decreasing function of Ü and its inverse is also a decreasing function. For a fixed session price, a session with a larger number of receivers has a lower effective session price and thus receives a higher rate. We refer to this effect as "tyranny of the majority" (ToM). ToM is a source of unfairness against unicast flows since multicast flows with the same total session price will receive a higher rate. However, the fact that multicast sessions tend to use more links than unicast sessions, particularly as the number of receivers becomes large, means that the session price × for a multicast flow is likely to be higher than that of a unicast session. To understand the fairness properties of rate allocations under receiver oriented utility functions we must determine whether the growth in price associated with the scaling of a multicast tree is sufficient to limit the effect of ToM as more receivers are added. 8 If one holds that improving the rate of many receivers at the expense of a few is reasonable, giving a larger share of bandwidth to larger groups may not seem unfair. We take the position that a bounded bias in favor of large groups is a defensible form of "controlled unfairness" but that there must be a mechanism to prevent starvation of unicast flows. 
VI. EFFECT OF MULTIPLE POINTS OF CONGESTION
In the previous section, we saw that ToM and the scaling of multicast trees have opposite effects. As we will see shortly, these effects are not equal in strength. The effect of ToM is likely to be the stronger of the two, allowing sessions with more receivers to receive a greater share of bandwidth. Whether we choose to accept this form of controlled unfairness or introduce a correction, we require a more precise understanding of the interaction of the two effects.
Consider a multicast session in the form of a complete tree of degree and depth , such as the one shown in Fig.  1 . The tree is modified to include a single link from the session source to what would ordinarily be the root. modified as before to include a single link at depth 0. Each link of the tree has capacity . This single link resides at depth 0 of the tree, with depth increasing as we move down the tree. We will use a receiver-oriented definition of session utility, but allow an arbitrary base utility function Ù´Üµ.
The tree has a receiver at each leafreceivers in total. The links at depth are shared with unicast sessionson each of links at level . We will refer to as the sharing depth. Let Ü ´Ü × µ be the vector of session rates, where Ü ¼ and Ü ½ Ü Ê are the rates of the multicast and unicast sessions, respectively, and Ê (21) where are the capacity constraints for the shared links.
We use the symmetry of the tree topology to reduce the problem to three variables: the multicast session rate Ü Ñ , the unicast session rate Ü , and the shadow price of a congested link . We rewrite the link capacity constraint ´Üµ ´Üµ
Solving the first-derivative conditions of the reduced problem for the logarithmic base utility function Ù´Üµ ÐÓ ´Üµ gives
We observe the following facts about this result: At the system optimum, the multicast session receives rate Ü Ñ ¾. This result is independent of the tree depth , the sharing depth , and, perhaps most surprising, the tree degree .
The invariance of the optimal multicast rate is a direct result of the choice of a logarithmic base utility function. As we will see, this property does not hold for other utility functions.
The remaining capacity on the shared links is split evenly among the sharing unicast sessions. Since the number of sharing sessions is , the optimal unicast rate depends on , and .
The total price seen by the multicast session is ¾ which is independent of the sharing depth. Under a receiver-oriented definition of session utility, this price is divided by the number of receivers to obtain the effective session price. Thus, effective session price is independent of , and under a logarithmic utility function.
Since the invariance we have observed appears to derive from a special choice of utility function, it is interesting to explore the behavior as we modify the functional form. We can combine the first-derivative conditions to derive the following optimality condition:
Equation (25) relates the marginal utility function Ù ¼´Ü µ to the function Ù ¼ £´Ü µ Ù ¼´ ´ Üµµ obtained when we flip Ù ¼ about the line Ü and scale both the argument and the result by the same factor . Any point at which these two functions intersect satisfies the optimality condition. Note that Ù ¼´Ü µ is the derivative of a concave and strictly increasing utility function, and therefore must be strictly decreasing. Thus, Ù ¼´Ü µ and Ù ¼ £´Ü µ intersect in exactly one point, establishing the uniqueness of the solution. Observe also that the scaling factor is of the form ½ ½. Scaling the argument of Ù ¼´ Üµ compresses the function along the horizontal axis and moves the point of intersection to the left, while scaling its result compresses the function along the vertical axis and moves the point of intersection to the right. Figure 2 shows how the points of intersection vary as a function of in a binary tree for three choices of base utility function: Ù´Üµ ÐÓ ´Üµ, Ù´Üµ ½ Ü and Ù´Üµ ´ ÐÓ ´Üµµ « . The first two functions are the now familiar logarithmic and MPD utility functions. The third one is shown by Kelly to yield max-min fairness in the limit as « ½ [2] . 9 In all three graphs, the single decreasing functions is Ù ¼´Ü µ, the first derivative of the base utility function, and the family of increasing functions are Ù ¼ £´Ü µ for decreasing (increasing ). The points where Ù ¼ £´Ü µ intersects Ù ¼´Ü µ give the optimal rates for the multicast session as a fraction of available capacity.
As established above, the intersection point is invariant and equal to ¾ for logarithmic utility. The intersection point is also fixed at ¾ when ½ for all three functions, corresponding to a sharing depth equal to the maximum tree depth. In both the MPD and max-min fair utility functions, however, the intersection point moves to the left as decreases, converging to the max-min fair rate. That is, as the sharing depth moves closer to the top of the tree, the number of bottleneck links decreases while the price on each congested link increases and the multicast session receives a smaller fraction of the available bandwidth.
VII. BOUNDED UNICAST FAIRNESS
In Section VI, we observed that a multicast session was able to obtain a higher rate than unicast sessions sharing the same bottleneck links. We showed that this unfairness is bounded in the presence of multiple points of congestion. However, this result exploited features of an idealized multicast session topology. Adopting a somewhat more realistic model in this section, we investigate whether the same type of bounded unfairness is possible in a more general setting with receiver-oriented utility functions. We also consider whether there is any multicast utility function that allows a strictly equal split of shared bottleneck bandwidth between a multicast an unicast session.
Adopting the fairness objective proposed by Handley, Floyd and Whetten [23] -that the algorithm be provably
In our experiments, we take « to a reasonably high power.´« alent to TCP-fairness in the case where Ù´Üµ ½ Ü, the MPD utility function. We will also consider a more relaxed notion of fairness, proposed by Wang and Schwartz [24] allowing bounded unfairness between multicast and unicast sessions. We first show that neither sender nor receiver oriented multicast utility functions lead to strict unicast-fair allocations and derive a result suggesting that strict fairness is difficult to achieve under any definition of session utility. Consider the modified star network topology shown in We give the unicast sessions the MPD utility function Ù´Üµ ½ Ü. The multicast function has utility function Ù´Ü Êµ ´Êµ Ù´Üµ. Let Ü Ñ be the rate of the multicast session and Ü be the rate of the unicast session to receiver . A strictly tcp-fair allocation would split the bandwidth on Ð ½ equally between Ü Ñ and Ü ½ , Ü Ñ Ü ½ ¬ ¾. We can substitute this rate into the optimality conditions of the optimization problem (15) (16) to determine the appropriate scaling function ´Êµ that will lead to the tcp-fair allocation, obtaining 
This result shows that tcp-fairness can be achieved in the optimization-based framework by maximizing a weighted sum of utilities with weights given by a scaling function ´Êµ. However, the presence of ¬, a topological parameter, in the scaling function suggests that the correct scaling function depends on topological properties of the network.
We now consider a generalized version of the previous example with no explicitly defined network topology.
Consider a network containing a set of links Ä. The network is shared by two sessions Ú and Û, which have rates Ü Ú and Ü Û , respectively. Each session uses a subset of links in the network and session Û only uses a proper subset of links that are also used by Ú. Formally, Ä´Ûµ Ä´Úµ Ä.
The sessions have Ê Ú and Ê Û receivers with Ê Ú Ê Û .
We assume that the path to the most constrained receiver in both Ú and Û is the same and is therefore entirely contained in Ä´Ûµ. The Lagrangian for the optimization problem is.
From the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, we derive an optimality condition on the ratio of marginal utilities.
Consider the family of base utility functions satisfying Ù ¼´Ü µ ½ Ü « « ½. Note that this family includes both the MPD and logarithmic utility functions. The ratio of session rates is
In a strictly tcp-fair allocation, the ratio Ü Û Ü Ú ½. From equation (31), it is clear that the actual value of this ratio depends on both the choice of scaling function and the ratio Ú Û . It is also apparent that the ratio Ü Û Ü Ú ½ approaches 1 in the limit as « ½. Thus, the exponent « offers one way to control unfairness for any choice of scaling function; increasing it moves the resulting rate allocation closer to max-min fairness. Strict unicast fairness could be achieved by exploiting a scaling law relating the total price of a multicast session to its number of receivers. Chuang and Sirbu propose such a law for static multicast costs [25] , [?] with the form
The authors empirically evaluate the scaling exponent , finding its value to be constant over a wide range of network topologies. This law assumes, however, that link Fig. 4 . A multicast tree with a modified star topology. All receivers are equally congested.
costs in the network are static. To be applicable for the purposes of congestion control, such a scaling law would have to be established for dynamically changing prices that reflect link congestion. If such a scaling law can be found, then strict unicast fairness would result from a multicast session utility function
We leave the search for such a scaling law as direction for future research, but note here that, as presented in Section IV-C the sum of session utilities under such a multicast utility function would not be invariant under a linear transformation of Ù´Üµ.
In the absence of a scaling law, strict unicast fairness appears to be difficult to achieve in the optimization-based framework without adjusting the scaling function in response to topological parameters. It is worth considering a relaxed version of tcp fairness, such as essential fairness proposed by Wang and Schwartz [24] . Essential fairness is evaluated on the restricted topology shown in Fig 
where Ü Ñ is the rate of the multicast session and Ü × is the rate of a unicast session along Ä × .
Setting up the optimization problem for this restricted topology and taking the Kuhn-Tucker conditions yields an optimality condition relating Ü Ñ and Ü × .
where × is the price of the soft bottleneck link and Ñ is the total price seen by the multicast session.
To get the lower bound of Ü Ñ , we observe that the lowest possible price for the multicast session occurs when each virtual link has bandwidth equivalent to the soft bottleneck. In this case, Ñ Ê × . It is also interesting to observe that for a logarithmic base utility function (Ù´Üµ ÐÓ ´Üµ) and « ½, the upper bound becomes
In this case, the upper bound is less fair to unicast sessions than with ¾ and we must choose strictly less than 1 to satisfy the essential fairness property of (34).
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper presented an optimization based scheme for multicast congestion control based on utility maximization. Appealing to the underlying economic theory behind this approach to congestion control, we proposed the use of a receiver oriented definition of session utility. By considering the incentive to split multicast sessions into smaller sessions, we showed that only receiver oriented utility functions ensure that the optimal solution of the utility maximization problem remains invariant under a linear transformation of the utility scale. We identified two sources of unfairness that arise when maximizing the sum of receiver oriented utility functions, one favoring unicast sessions and one favoring multicast. When these two effects are combined, a net unfairness results that favors sessions with many receivers over sessions with few, with unicast sessions faring worst of all. This unfairness is bounded, however, and the tightness of the bound depends on the form of the base utility function. When comparing multicast sessions against TCP, where TCP sessions are modeled using the Minimum Potential Delay utility function, we can limit the multicast session rate to no more than Ô Ê times the rate of a unicast session between the source and the worst-case receiver. While we have found it difficult to achieve strict fairness between unicast and multicast traffic, we argue that bounded unfairness is a reasonable goal, particularly as it provides an incentive to use multicast by rewarding larger groups.
Much future work still needs to be done in this area. Although single-rate multicast with a single source is an important class of multicast traffic, many multicast applications do not fall into this category. An important problem, therefore, is extending the optimization-based techniques to multi-rate multicast, where a single session may support receivers with different rates and to multicast sessions with multiple sources. This problem is challenging because the global optimization problem does not admit an easy decomposition into per-session optimization problems in the multi-rate case.
We also still lack a practical protocol for single-rate multicast based on our approach. While we have shown that existing distributed algorithms can be adapted to single-rate multicast with only minor modifications, there are a number of technical issues that will have to be addressed by any practical implementation. Our approach differs from many multicast congestion control schemes in that its fairness properties are not dependent on accepting feedback from a restricted set of receivers. However, other protocols restrict feedback not only for fairness, but also to eliminate feedback implosion and redun-dancy. An optimization-based protocol must find other mechanisms for dealing with these problems. Existing optimization-based mechanisms for unicast rely on packetmarking techniques to communicate link prices to end hosts. The end-to-end nature of a unicast path allows the receiver to infer the total session price from the fraction of marked packets arriving in a measurement interval. In a multicast session each receiver sees only marks generated along one ene-to-end path through the tree, which only account for a fraction of the session price. Feedback is thus required from all receivers to determine the total session price. Redundancy arises when a marked packet traverses a router and is copied on more than one downstream interface, effectively multiplying the upstream path price and inflating the true cost of the tree. We believe that both redundancy and feedback problems can be addressed using general purpose network services for multicast transport [26] to provide feedback aggregation and a sophisticated mark-forwarding mechanism.
